DAY OF DAYS – ST.JULIEN – 31st JULY 1917 by Paul Johnson
The attack on the St Julien position, which has been given the name of the Battle of Pilkem, took many months of intense planning which saw the Hertfordshire’s, along with other units of the 39th Division, undergo a special course of training. Once this was completed they were ready to take part in the assault which, unbeknown to them, was to bring complete devastation across the home county.
The plan of attack for the 39th Division was laid down in the Unit War Diary. The section to be attacked was divided into three separate objectives, roughly the first, second, and third German defence systems, named in Operation Orders as the Blue, Black and Green lines respectively. There was to be a very thorough artillery preparation for some days previous to the offensive, to be followed by the infantry advancing in leapfrog formation behind an impenetrable barrage. The 116th and 117th Infantry Brigades were to capture the Blue and Black lines, and the 118th Brigade, composed of the 4th/5th Black Watch, the 5th Cheshire Regiment, 1st Cambridgeshire Regiment and the 1st Hertfordshire Regiment, were to assault, capture and consolidate the Green line.
This latter objective was rightly considered the most difficult, as it was not possible to give it the same amount of artillery preparation as the others, on account of a lack of direct observation and the distance it was situated from the guns. In fact, the Brigadier in his address to the Regiment on the day before the offensive was launched, stated this, and added that ”Pride of Place” in the centre of the line had been allotted to the 1st Hertfordshire Regiment.
The action was expected to be very local, especially as the success of an attack of this nature primarily depended upon the close proximity of the infantry to a creeping barrage. To fully appreciate the work performed by the Battalion on 31st July, it must be remembered that all ranks had had it impressed on them, day after day for some time, that their part was to consist of merely walking behind the creeping barrage with slung rifles, and that no opposition would be met with, other than an improbable machine gun nest, which if necessary, would be dealt with by tanks. In due course the Battalion reached almost as high state of perfection as was possible to expect, in their training, and on 22nd July, with the remainder of the 118th Infantry brigade they moved by a motor bus to the camps near St.Jean Ter Biazin, preparatory to taking up the assembly positions for the battle. Routes to the line were arranged and one officer for each company went forward on the 27th and 28th to arrange for the assembly positions, which consisted for the most part of shell holes behind Hill Top Farm.
On the night of the 30th/31st July 1917 the Battalion left the bivouacs near Vlamertinghe, which they had occupied on the previous day, and after a rather trying march across country through desultory shellfire and gas, in the pitch dark, finally reached their assembly position just after midnight, suffering only a few casualties.
The following are extracts from operation orders issued by Lieutenant Colonel Frank Page, issued on the 29th July 1917.
1. (a) the 5th Army is to capture the hostile trench system East and North East of Ypres on Z day.
(b) The XVIII Corps will capture the hostile trench system on its present front. Right Division = 39th. Left Division = 51st. Reserve Divisions = 48th Right and 11th Left
(c) The 39th division will attack at zero hour on the Z day and will capture the German trenches on the frontage shown on the attached map as far as the Green line, which will be known as Cuthbert trench when consolidated.
(d) The 23rd Division (Prussian) is holding the area to be attacked by the 39th division. Its probable dispositions are 1 Battalion 448th infantry Regiment, and half Battalion 449th infantry Regiment in the frontline system, the same in the Kitchener system, and the same in the Langamark Line. The 450th Regiment is said to be in the neighbourhood of Poelcappelle.
(e) The objective of the 118th infantry brigade is the Green line. The attack on the Green line will be carried out with:-
6th Cheshires on the right. 1st Hertfordshires in the centre. 4th/5th Black Watch on the Left.
1st Cambridgeshires in reserve near Border House.
(f) Three machine guns of the 118th machine gun company and two stokes mortars are allotted to the Battalion.
2. Assembly
The brigade will move into the assembly position on Y/Z night. The 1st Hertfordshire’s will leave the camp at 8:45 PM and March via Queens Road-Bridge 2-and Overland track, to the assembly positions. Nos.1 and 3 Companies near Irish Farm, Nos.2 and 4 Companies and Battalion Headquarters to La Belle Alliance and Coney Street.
3. Advance
(a) At 0+1 hour 40 minutes the 118th infantry brigade will advance from the assembly position. Herts and Cheshires from the X line and Black Watch and Cambs from the canal bank.
(b) The 1st Herts will arrive just West of the blue line at 0+2 hours 10 minutes. The further advance will be made so that the three attacking battalions are on the East bank of the Steenbeek by 0+6 hours 10 minutes.
The orders for the attack of the 1st Herts were:
No.1 Company on the right and No.2 Company on the left, each into waves, in the front-line.
In Support, No.3 on the right and No.4 on the left, also into waves.
The company officers were:-
No.1 Company. Lieutenant Hardy commanding with Lieutenants Walthew, Thompson and Scott.
No.2 Company. Captain Lowry commanding with Lieutenants Ritchie, Head and Secretan.
No.3 Company. Lieutenant Gallo commanding with Lieutenants Marchington, Francis and Edwards.
No.4 Company. Captain D’Arcy Fisher commanding with Lieutenants Lake, Macintosh, Gilbey and King.
The following is a transcribed account of the action of the 31st July 1917 as described by an officer of the 1st Battalion, Hertfordshire Regiment, Captain Bernard Gripper.
At 3:45 am on 31 July 1917, just as dawn was breaking, the barrage opened with a burst of flame along the whole line of the divisional front, the most intense barrage that had been put up, to that period of the war. The 1st Hertfordshire’s were not due to move off for some time so, as no reason for secrecy existed, fires were lighted and the men had breakfast.
The weather, which had been fine practically throughout July, had broken on the 28th and during the whole of the 31st low-lying clouds and drizzle rendered co-operation with the Royal Flying Corps almost impossible. The state of the ground was such, from the rain, that progress of any sort could only be made with great difficulty, and it was this fact, more than anything else, which led to the comparative failure of the operation.
The Germans were well aware of the impending offensive and it transpired subsequently that they were also in possession of most of the details of it. They had accordingly withdrawn most of their guns in the forward area, and had apparently resigned any idea of holding their first system seriously; which was not surprising in view of the pounding it had received from our guns.
Hardly a shred of wire was to be seen, and what remained of the trenches was lightly held by inferior troops. The Blue Line gave little trouble, nor did the black line, although the Falkenhayn Redoubt, on the Southern age of Kitchener Wood needed the attentions of a tank before it succumbed. The 1st Hertfordshire’s left their assembly positions about 5am and advanced in artillery formation over the captured ground to the first German line of defence, the blue line, where they took cover on account of the desultory shelling and a certain amount of machine gun fire. The latter was silenced shortly afterwards, by which time the 116th infantry brigade had reached the black line.
So far, the attack had gone exactly to plan. While the 1st Hertfordshire’s were on the Black Line, bearings were taken in order to confirm that the Battalion was keeping direction, and to ascertain the position of St. Juliaan, which lay over the crest of the Ridge. The 1st Hertfordshire’s resumed their advance according to schedule, No.1 and 2 Companies leading in artillery formation, followed by Nos. 3 and 4, being wished “Good Luck” by the 116th Brigade as they went through them. On gaining the crest of the first ridge leading platoons came under machine gun fire; the signal to extend was immediately given, and the promptitude with which platoon commanders and NCOs got them men out of artillery formation, saved many casualties.
The “Dead Ground” West of the Steenbeek was reached and the Battalion had to cross the stream by a plank bridge owing to its swollen state. It was here that the Battalion had their first disappointment, as the two tanks detailed to accompany them were both out of action. One stuck irretrievably in a shell hole, and the other fell into the Steenbeek, and although its crew made gallant efforts to get it under way again, they could not do so. The Battalion, after crossing the Steenbeek, having plenty of time to do so, reorganised in the “Dead Ground” on the far side of the stream. The Colonel was full of optimism and the example he set kept everyone cool and collected. The Padre wandered from company to company, although shelling was pretty continuous, cheering the men up giving them cigarettes and showing absolutely no fear, as calm as if such a thing as fear never existed.
The moment for the advance came, and although the intense barrage promised did not exist, as it appeared that only two 18 pounders and two 4.5” Howitzers were in action on this part of the line, the Herts guards swept up the Hill. Reconnaissance patrols from No.1 Company were then extended along the St Julien-Poelcappelle Road, but No.4 Company was shortly afterwards compelled to withdraw a little owing to “shorts” from the two howitzers. By this time the Battalion were in touch with the Cheshires on the right, but there was no sign of the Black Watch, which had apparently got hung up in Kitcheners Wood. A Battery of 77mm guns had been discovered between the Steenbeek and St. Juliaan, which were duly appropriated.
The unpleasant features on the left of the line at this time were (a) no sign of the Black Watch and (B) persistent machine gun fire from some pillboxes half left. At about 9:35am a message was received from the officer commanding the left company of the Cheshire Regiment, intimating that the Germans were massing for accounts attack on the Springfield-Winnipeg Road, and at the same time a reconnaissance patrol of the 1st Hertfordshire’s reported that the Germans were holding a line of old artillery dugouts about 400 yards East of the Poelcappelle-St.Juliaan Road. This information was sent to Battalion headquarters on the Steenbeek, and Colonel Page ordered the two leading companies to move up and man the latter road, with a view to forestalling any counter attack that might be in contemplation by the enemy. The road was manned and the enemy were in sight of the Battalion for the first time, in force, that day. On the left the counter barrage was very heavy, and the left of the Battalion was entirely in the air, and the ground was a very sticky making the going very heavy.
The casualties on this flank were getting heavy, and still the promised intense barrage was conspicuous by its absence. During this advance Captain Lowry, commanding No.2 Company was killed. About this time two German aeroplanes, flying very low, passed over the Battalion, firing very lights, and machine-gunning the Battalion, and shortly afterwards the Germans launched a counter-attack. This was in some force, commencing with a line in extended order, which advanced up to the line of dugouts previously mentioned, when we joined up with about 100 others who were taking cover there, and who had opened heavy rifle fire to cover the advance.
At this point the counter-attack was stopped by a rifle and Lewis Gun fire, mainly from No.1 Company on the right. The heaviness of the enemy casualties this point and also later in the day, is vouched for by those of the Regiment who were taken prisoner, Lieutenant Walther estimating that he passed upwards of 150 German dead alone, on the ground over which the Battalion and advanced. At 10:10am the intense creeping barrage was due to recommence in order to cover the advance to the third objective, the green line, but this completely failed to materialise on the battalion’s front, owing, as it transpired later, to the impossibility of moving the guns up through the mud. Had this barrage been available, there is little doubt that the attack would have been entirely successful. Casualties up to this time, especially on the right, had not been heavy, and the men were in excellent spirits. The attack had to continue, and the men followed their officers without a moment’s hesitation, into a veritable hail of rifle and machine gun fire, proceeding from the shelters about 300 yards in front. In spite of all their special training, for this very attack, in advancing at a walk in comparative safety behind a barrage, the Battalion adopted the only possible course, namely open warfare methods of short sectional and individual rushes, with the greatest promptitude and gallantry. The casualties were at once devastatingly high, Lieutenant Gallo, commanding No.3 Company and Lieutenant Scott of No.1 Company were killed almost at once, and many officers including Lieutenant Hardy, commanding No.1 Company, were wounded, but the Battalion carried on, taking a heavy toll of the enemy, as was discovered when the position, about 400 yards east of the Poelcappelle-St.Juliaan Road, was taken at the point of the bayonet, together with some 70 or more prisoners.
By this time practically the whole of the supporting companies were in the front line. On this position being captured the Germans put down a very heavy barrage underlying about midway between it and St.Juliaan, thus entirely cutting off the Battalion from any reinforcements which might have been supplied by the 1st Cambridgeshire Regiment who were in reserve.
Lieutenants Francis, Thompson and Walthew on the right, with Lieutenants Ritchie and Head on the left and Lieutenant Secretan in the centre, went on with the remnants of the Battalion. On the left Lieutenant Ritchie and Head advanced on either side of a cross hedge with about five men each, Lieutenant Head advanced on the left side and was never seen again. Lieutenant Ritchie went on the right side of the hedge and found a row of pillboxes about 200 yards on, carrying his Lewis gun himself, he tried to get around them, but was knocked out, so Private Atkins went on with the three remaining men.
In the centre, Lieutenant Secretan was killed, and the final act of the Battalion in the gallant fight can best be given in Lieutenant Francis’ own words, who with Lieutenant Thompson, was taken prisoner on the Green Line. “Our line was woefully thin by this time, consisting mainly of No.1 Company, some of my own company No.3, and some of No.4 Company. The remainder of No.3 Company could be seen forming a second line some 300 yards in the rear. It was here I met Lieutenant Thompson of No.1 Company, the only other officer that could be seen. We had a hurried consultation: our left flank was bare, obviously non-existent: our right flank was in touch with the company of the Cheshires, but beyond them in the rear it could be seen that the cemetery was still untaken. Heavy fighting could be heard going on and the Germans showed their presence by the number of rockets being sent up. In front, we had a small creeping barrage, nothing to what we had seen earlier in the morning, we heard afterwards most of the guns had been unable to move owing to the mud. Everywhere around us was the cry, “stretcher bearer wanted”.
We remembered our strict orders, ”Never mind your flanks, carry on with your job”, and decided to push on, taking advantage of the barrage and not waiting for our second line. The time now was somewhere around 12 noon. It was rather like leading lambs to the slaughter, as we had a pretty fair idea of what the Langmarck Line was going to be like though as yet we couldn’t see it, owing to the hedge lining the road in front of us, and also knew that beyond those few men in our second line there was no further help. It cannot, therefore, be wondered at that our men, who had behaved up to now so magnificently, began to lose heart. It was just at this time that a Private of the Cheshires came up to us, saluted as if on parade, and said “Connecting file Cheshires sir”. The way this man behaved was wonderful, he stuck to us the whole time and was eventually captured with us, he kept in front with Thompson and myself shouting, “There are Cheshires, come on the Herts”. I believe Thompson has his name, as he certainly deserved a medal. We carried on at the walking pace keeping a good line, and having comparatively few casualties, until we reached the road. After going through the hedge, lining the road, we had our first view of the Green Line, the great big trench on top of a rise, and what was worse two thick lines of uncut wire in front, but it was our objective and the Germans in the trench in front of us could be seen running away. It was at this point that Sgt Hammond came up to me with a broad grin on his face and said something about at last getting at the Bosche, and would he tell the men to get ready to go absolutely all out.
Immediately afterwards a Private came up and reported Sgt Hammond badly wounded in the leg, he died immediately I believe. I won’t say much about Sgt Hammond, as anyone who was out in France with the Hertfordshire’s knew him, but I should like it to be known that he died just as he had always carried on, absolutely fearless and looking as if there was no finer fun on earth than going over the top.
We were now faced with this terrible uncut wire, and the German fire was beginning to be particularly heavy again. Thompson and I managed to scramble through it with a few men the remainder following. The Germans, unfortunately, who were leaving the trench looked round, saw how few we were, and from both flanks and from the front the most murderous machine gun fire was poured onto us. Those who had not yet reached the wire went back a bit, and the few who had got through went on a little way and finally took cover in a shell hole. Our little party was now reduced to about six men, including the two officers and the Cheshires orderly. The Cheshire company on our right had been more successful and reached the trench and entered it.
Our barrage was now knocking the Langmarck Line about in front of us, it seemed deserted now immediately in front though on the flanks it was obviously occupied. It was bitter to sit there and think that with a few more men and more ammunition, as small arms ammunition had mostly been used in St. Juliaan, the trench was ours for the asking. For a little while nothing happened, we lit flares for our aeroplanes, but they quickly went away, and a German one appeared flying low and firing on us. It may be mentioned that although our aeroplanes were obviously doing good work, we were hampered and worried ever since leaving St. Juliaan by low flying German machines.
Germans could be seen well in our rear, both to the right and left of us, though our immediate rear was clear, and soon our men could be seen advancing again. They reached the wire and we tried to re-join them. It was hopeless, the fire was too heavy. Three of the men with us were shot at once, so we sheltered again in a shell hole, and the men who had come up had to fall back. I gather that they were all wiped out as they were practically surrounded on all sides. We were still mystified as to what had happened to the Cheshire company but we quickly knew, as Thompson pointed out some Germans with some English coming out of trench on our right, and to our horror the English were the prisoners and were picking up the wounded and searching the ground. The Germans were now everywhere, the time being about 1:30pm, and we were finally taken about 4pm. It seemed to us we were the only two survivors of that awful day. Corporal Oliver of No.1. Company I believe, had been badly wounded getting through the wire and died very shortly afterwards. He had shown very fine spirit. I know little of what happened on the left. The Black Watch obviously failed early. No.2 Company got held up at the pillboxes where Lieutenant Head was killed. No.4 Company I do not remember seeing at all. After being captured we crossed the Langmarck Line and were taken to Passchendaele. The Germans had evidently had a bad fright, as every arrangement for a hurried leave was obvious; guns left lying unattended in the fields and everything very much in confusion. There were however many battalions massed at Passchendaele ready to move up, and obviously very reluctant to do so.
What happened with the Battalion headquarters is given from notes by the Reverend E Popham MC, chaplain to the Battalion and Regiment, and Sergeant Major Tite DCM. The padre writes; it was while we were at the Steenbeek that the doctor, Captain Charles, did such magnificent work, going from a shell hole to shell hole dressing wounds. After the Battalion had advanced from the stream a message came asking for reinforcements, and I lost sight of Colonel Page, hearing a few minutes later that he had been killed instantly by a piece of shell.
The Sergeant Major writes; about 12:30pm the adjutant, Captain Milne, was hit and died almost at once. I got together all available men, about 25, mainly signallers and officers servants, and formed a line in shell holes. We then opened fire and the enemy, who were advancing over undulating ground at about 500 yards distance, were compelled to halt. We continued to hold them with the aid of a few stragglers who found their way back, and a Sgt and about 20 other ranks of the 14th Hampshire Regiment, but running short of ammunition we had to retire to a partly dug trench on the opposite side of the river. Just before this I stopped a bullet in my left arm which put that limb out of action, and a few minutes later captain Charles, the medical officer, was hit in the thigh. The chaplain at once went to him, but I yelled to him to lie down. I was later reinforced by Sgt Ashwell who turned up with a Lewis gun and one man carrying magazines. This was a great help and I placed him on our left flank where there was a gap of about 1000 yards between us and the black watch. During the whole of the time the chaplain, with total disregard for personal safety, did all possible to aid the wounded, and when he retired, he was the last to leave and brought with him, almost carrying him, a man was wounded in the leg. About 6pm Lieutenant Walker of the 1st Cambridgeshire Regiment’s arrived with half a company and took over command, ordering me to go back and get my arm seen to. This I did and after walking until nearly midnight, found our transport near Elverdinghe, where I reported to Major Phillips, afterwards receiving treatment at the Corps dressing station nearby. The padre also writes; we had a few badly wounded men in a pillbox, while I was with them I heard that captain Charles had been hit, and calling to him they found that his thigh had been shattered by a bullet. After making him as comfortable as we could, four splendid stretcher bearers crawled down the hillside with him and eventually got him back, one of the bravest bits of stretcher work ever done by the Herts. I wish I could remember their names. By this time, we were numb with sorrow and also a bit anxious as we did not know where the British army was, but after a time RSM Tite managed to get in touch, and found that a company of the Cambridgeshire Regiment were waiting in our rear, and we felt easier. On arriving at the Cambs trench I found an officer in charge and our boys fighting happily, and as it was not the place for badly wounded man, I decided to try and take him back, and we managed to get to a dressing station at about 7pm. The next morning, I found brigade headquarters and the Brigadier asked me to take charge of the remainder of the Battalion until Major Phillips could come up, which I did until relieved on the evening of the 1st August 1917.
The action at St. Julien saw 28 gallantry awards bestowed on members of the Hertfordshire Regiment and those attached to the unit. Amongst these were 265330 Private William Sell (William's story), who was wounded in the hand and face by shellfire. He was evacuated from the battlefield and never returned.
The casualties: Casualties were very heavy with 459 men being killed, missing or wounded. This was 100% of its Officers and about 75% of its Other Ranks.
A Memorial to the men of the Hertfordshire Regiment who fought at St. Julien on the 31st July 1917. The memorial was designed and instigated by the Herts at War Project - the memorial unveiling.
Links:
- Casualties for the 31st July 1917
- 'The Hertfordshire Guards' - written and performed by local musician Mr Ray Owen entitled 'The Hertfordshire Guards' which tells the story of the attack that morning of the 31/7/1917. Both enjoyable and historically accurate. Select play on the image below to hear Ray's excellent song: